Plato on Well-Being by Brown, Eric
for	the	Routledge	Handbook	of	Well-Being	ed.	Guy	Fletcher	
PLATO	ON	WELL-BEING	
Eric	Brown	Author	biography:	Eric	Brown,	associate	professor	of	philosophy	at	Washington	University	in	St.	Louis,	researches	and	teaches	ancient	Greek	and	Roman	philosophy,	primarily,	and	is	the	author	of	Stoic	Cosmopolitanism	(Cambridge,	forthcoming).	
1.	Plato's	uses	of	well-being	
	 To	speak	of	well-being,	as	they	frequently	do,	the	characters	in	Plato's	dialogues	use	several	expressions	interchangeably,	including	the	inNinitive	phrases	"to	live	well"	(eu	zēn),	"to	be	successful"	(eudaimonein),	and	"to	do	well"	(eu	prattein),	as	well	as	the	related	abstract	nouns	"success"	and	"doing	well"	(eudaimonia,	eupragia).	The	concept	invoked	by	these	expressions	plays	two	central	roles	in	their	discussions,	as	some	characters	propose	that	well-being	is	or	at	least	should	be	the	ultimate	goal	for	both	individual	human	action	and	political	decision-making.		 The	second,	political	role	for	well-being	prompts	disagreement.	Socrates	(in	the	
Gorgias	and	Republic,	especially),	the	Eleatic	stranger	(in	the	Statesman),	and	the	Athenian	(in	the	Laws)	assert	that	political	action—lawmaking,	judging,	educating,	war-making,	and	the	rest—should	promote	the	well-being	of	the	political	community's	citizens.	But	other	characters,	including	Callicles	(in	the	Gorgias)	and	Thrasymachus	(in	the	Republic),	  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maintain	that	politics	should	serve	the	well-being	of	politicians.	The	ensuing	debates	in	large	part	concern	competing	conceptions	of	well-being.	Socrates	and	his	allies	emphasize	cooperative	goods	as	opposed	to	the	competitive	trophies	favored	by	Callicles,	Thrasymachus,	and	their	kind.	Team	Socrates	suggests	that	if	politicians	would	take	the	correct	view	of	well-being,	they	would	not	see	a	deep	conNlict	between	their	own	and	that	of	the	citizens.	Team	Callicles	and	Thrasymachus	suggests	that	if	politicians	took	the	Socratic	view	of	well-being,	they	would	display	weakness	and	forgo	some	of	life's	greatest	advantages.			 The	Nirst,	ethical	role	for	well-being,	by	contrast,	prompts	no	controversy.	Plato's	characters	agree	that	everyone	wants	his	or	her	life	to	go	well	and	that	on	reNlection,	at	least,	all	our	other	goals	are	subordinate	to	this	(Euthd.	278e,	Symp.	204e-205a).	So	Socrates	regularly	assumes	that	one	should	act	for	the	sake	of	one's	own	well-being,	and	this	"eudaimonist	axiom"	is	readily	accepted	even	by	those	interlocutors	such	as	Callicles	and	Thrasymachus	who	disagree	sharply	with	Socrates	about	how	we	should	live.		 In	contrast	to	Plato's	characters,	modern	readers	often	take	the	ethical	role	to	be	more	problematic	than	the	political	one.	Modern	political	liberalism	wants	states	to	provide	the	conditions	for	the	individual	pursuit	of	well-being	more	than	well-being	itself,	but	many	modern	moral	philosophers	reject	the	eudaimonist	axiom	still	more	thoroughly.	They	read	Socratic	ethics	as	an	objectionable	egoism,	incompatible	with	the	quite	reasonable	thought	that	other	beings'	ends	should	matter	to	us.	But	these	critics	are	insufNiciently	attuned	to	the	varieties	of	well-being	in	Plato's	dialogues.	Unlike	many	of	his	interlocutors,	and	unlike	his	modern	critics,	Socrates	clings	to	the	platitudinous	identiNication	of	well-being	and	doing	well,	and	he	insists	that	doing	well	is	the	same	as	acting	virtuously	(Charm.	
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171e-172a,	Cr.	48b,	Euthd.	278e-282d,	Gorg.	507c,	Rep.	353e-354a).	But	if	well-being	is	simply	virtuous	activity,	then	acting	for	the	sake	of	one's	own	well-being	is	simply	acting	so	as	to	act	virtuously,	which	is	not	objectionably	egoistic	at	all.			 This	is	the	Socratic	view	of	well-being	that	Plato	favors,	and	the	dialogues	advance	this	view	in	part	by	rejecting	several	other	views,	sometimes	because	they	conNlict	with	ordinary	thoughts	about	what	makes	a	human	life	go	well,	sometimes	because	they	lead	to	civil	strife	as	political	ends,	and	often	because	they	cannot	play	the	role	that	the	eudaimonist	axiom	sets	for	them,	to	be	the	ultimate	end	that	explains	and	justiNies	human	action.		
2.	Naïve	conceptions	
	 In	the	Euthydemus,	after	they	agree	that	everyone	obviously	wants	to	do	well	(eu	
prattein),	Socrates	and	Cleinias	take	it	to	be	even	more	obvious	that	we	do	well	by	possessing	many	things	that	are	good	for	us	(278e-279a).	They	then	list	the	goods	that	apparently	cause	our	lives	to	go	well:	material	goods	(riches),	goods	of	the	body	(health,	good	looks,	bodily	needs),	social	goods	(noble	birth,	power,	honor),	goods	of	character	(temperance,	justice,	bravery),	and	goods	of	intellect	(wisdom)	(279a-c).			 Socrates	and	Cleinias	do	not	explicitly	say	what	well-being	is.	They	say	only	what	role	it	plays	for	us—everyone	wants	to	get	it—and	what	causes	it—possessing	the	things	that	are	good	for	us.	One	might	produce	a	sophisticated	account	of	what	well-being	is,	to	explain	how	the	things	that	are	good	for	us	cause	our	well-being.	But	Socrates	and	Cleinias	do	not.	Still,	their	naïve	account	can	suggest	that	well-being	is	simply	a	state	caused	by,	and	
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perhaps	constituted	by,	the	possession	of	things	that	are	good	for	us.	So	understood,	Socrates	and	Cleinias	offer	something	like	an	"objective	list"	conception	of	well-being. 	But	1their	particular	list	leaves	important	questions	unanswered.	Is	it	really	comprehensive?	Where	are	pleasure	and	friendship?	Is	each	of	the	listed	goods	necessary	for	well-being?	And	do	they	all	contribute	equally	to	well-being?	Could,	say,	sufNiciently	massive	wealth	and	power	compensate	for	a	deNicit	of	justice?	Perhaps,	then,	it	is	better	to	think	of	this	
Euthydemus	passage	as	an	introduction	to	a	family	of	views	of	well-being,	a	family	whose	members	differ	on	which	goods	belong	on	the	list,	how	the	listed	goods	are	ranked,	and	so	on.			 Other	Platonic	characters	also	appeal	to	some	member	of	this	family,	and	like	Socrates	and	Cleinias	in	the	Euthydemus,	they	insist	that	they	are	appealing	to	an	ordinary	understanding	of	well-being.	In	the	Gorgias,	Polus	insists	that	even	a	child	would	know	that	someone	can	be	unjust	and	successful	(eudaimōn)	by	amassing	great	wealth	and	power	(470c-471d).	Thrasymachus	makes	the	same	claim	in	the	Republic:	everyone	would	agree	that	the	complete	tyrant,	whose	injustice	leads	to	complete	power	and	great	resources,	enjoys	a	successful	life	(344a-c).	When	Glaucon	and	Adeimantus	worry	that	it	might	be	better	to	be	unjust	than	just,	they	are	relying	on	what	they	take	to	be	commonsense	thoughts	about	the	importance	of	competitive	goods	to	well-being	(364a),	and	when	Adeimantus	objects	that	the	guardians	of	Socrates'	ideal	city	would	not	enjoy	good	lives,	he	takes	it	for	granted	that	wealth	is	necessary	for	living	well	(419a-420a).	All	these	characters	assume	that	wealth	and	power	are	necessary	for	well-being,	and	they	all	claim	that	this	assumption	is	widespread.			
	On	such	views,	see	Fletcher	(this	volume).1
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	 But	Socrates	clearly	rejects	the	assumption.	He	calls	the	conception	of	eudaimonia	that	drives	Adeimantus'	objection	to	the	guardians'	situation	"foolish	and	adolescent"	(466b).	In	fact,	Socrates	objects	not	merely	to	conceptions	of	well-being	according	to	which	wealth	and	power	are	necessary.	He	offers	reasons	to	doubt	a	broad	range	of	"objective	list"	views	of	well-being.			 He	advances	one	reason	in	the	Euthydemus.	After	Socrates	and	Cleinias	complete	their	list	of	the	goods	that	are	supposed	to	make	life	go	well,	Socrates	argues	Nirst	that	the	possession	of	a	good	would	not	make	one's	life	go	well	unless	that	good	beneNited	one	and	that	a	good	would	not	beneNit	one	unless	it	were	used	(280b-e).	He	then	argues	that	using	a	good	would	not	beneNit	one	unless	it	were	used	rightly	and	that	using	a	good	rightly	requires	using	it	wisely	(280e-281b).	A	large	part	of	Socrates'	reasoning	here	is	immediately	accessible	to	Cleinias.	If	we	have	advantages	such	as	wealth,	power,	or	honor,	we	have	a	greater	capacity	to	act	than	if	we	lack	these	things,	and	it	is	better	for	us	to	have	a	greater	capacity	to	act	only	if	we	act	wisely.	Wielding	great	power	foolishly	does	us	no	good.			 But	Socrates	pushes	this	reasoning	beyond	common	sense.	Because	the	things	ordinarily	thought	to	be	good	for	us	seem	to	depend	in	large	measure	on	luck,	the	proponent	of	the	initial	"objective	list"	view	can	sum	up	his	view	by	saying	that	good	fortune	makes	our	lives	go	well.	Socrates	insists,	instead,	that	wisdom	plays	the	role	of	good	fortune	(279d),	that	it	makes	our	lives	go	well	(281b).	His	point	seems	to	be	that	the	causal	power	to	beneNit,	to	make	a	life	go	well,	cannot	belong	to	all	the	initially	listed	goods,	because	most	of	them	sometimes	beneNit	us	and	sometimes	harm	us,	depending	on	whether	they	are	used	wisely	or	foolishly	(281d-e).	On	his	view,	only	wisdom	possesses	
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that	causal	power,	because	only	it	has	the	power	to	cause	wise,	beneNicial	use,	without	ever	causing	foolish,	harmful	use. 	2	 Socrates	might	have	insisted	that	wisdom	no	more	possesses	the	power	to	effect	well-being	than	wealth	does,	because	one	needs	both	wisdom	to	guide	the	use	and	another	set	of	goods	to	be	wisely	used.	But	he	does	not	say	this.	He	says	that	only	wisdom	causes	well-being	(281b),	and	that	only	wisdom	is	good	for	us	(281e,	292b).	This	outstrips	common	sense,	but	it	is	not	unintelligible.	Socrates	might	distinguish	between	necessary	conditions	and	causes	(cf.	Phdo	99a-b)	and	identify	wealth	and	the	other	initially	listed	assets	as	mere	necessary	conditions	of	wisdom's	causing	well-being.	Just	as	the	cobbler	makes	a	shoe	but	could	not	do	so	without	leather,	so	wisdom	makes	well-being	but	could	not	do	so	without	certain	advantages	present.	This	leaves	questions	about	what	one	needs,	beyond	wisdom,	to	live	well,	but	in	the	Euthydemus,	Socrates	is	content	to	leave	such	questions	unanswered,	so	long	as	he	has	convinced	Cleinias	that	only	wisdom	causes	well-being. 		3	 So	understood,	Socrates'	argument	turns	on	some	curious	and	contentious	thoughts	about	causation,	but	his	central	point	can	be	expressed	in	other	terms.	Of	the	goods	that	the	"objective	list"	conception	takes	to	constitute	well-being,	most	are	only	conditionally	good—beneNicial	in	some	circumstances	(when	wisely	used)	but	not	in	others	(when	foolishly	used)—whereas	wisdom	is	unconditionally	good	(it	never	uses	itself	foolishly).	Now,	nothing	in	the	very	idea	of	well-being	requires	that	it	or	its	constituents	be	unconditionally	good.	But	the	idea	of	a	goal	for	the	sake	of	which	one	should	do	everything	one	does	is	
	Cf.	Dimas	(2002),	McCabe	(2002).2	Cf.	Jones	(2013).3
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different.	This	is	the	idea	of	an	ultimate	end	that	could	fully	explain	and	justify	action,	and	a	merely	conditional	good	is	not	up	to	that	task.	When	one	acts	with	a	conditional	good	as	one's	end,	we	can	always	ask,	"What	makes	that	a	good	end	to	pursue	here	and	now?"	This	open	question	renders	the	justiNication	of	the	action	incomplete.				 Socrates	does	not	fully	develop	this	line	of	thought	in	the	Euthydemus,	but	it	returns	elsewhere,	along	with	an	additional	set	of	reasons	to	doubt	the	"objective	list"	family	of	conceptions	of	well-being.	These	fuller	objections	are	launched	not	directly	against	the	naïve	suggestion	that	Socrates	and	Cleinias	introduce	in	the	Euthydemus,	but	against	some	more	sophisticated	theories	about	what	well-being	is.		
3.	The	Protagorean	conception	
	 One	sophisticated	way	to	develop	the	ordinary	thought	that	a	life	goes	well	by	the	possession	of	good	things	vindicates	every	member	of	that	family	of	views	(and	then	some).	Protagoras	says	that	a	human	being	is	the	measure	of	the	things	that	are	and	are	not,	and	Plato's	Theaetetus	construes	this	as	the	thought,	for	instance,	that	if	the	wind	appears	cold	to	Peter	and	warm	to	Paul,	then	the	wind	is	cold	for	Peter	and	it	is	warm	for	Paul	(151d-160e).	(Actually,	Socrates	seems	to	imply	that	Protagoras	is	committed	to	thinking	that	if	the	wind	appears	cold	to	Peter,	then	the	wind-for-Peter	is-for-Peter	cold-for-Peter, 	4but	I	will	proceed	with	a	slightly	simpliNied	picture	in	view.)		 In	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates	addresses	more	than	one	Protagoreanism.	He	sometimes	worries	about	a	perfectly	general	version	of	the	"measure	doctrine,"	so	that	whatever	kind	
	Waterlow	(1977:	33-34),	Lee	(2005:	44-47).4
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of	appearance	we	are	talking	about,	if	X	appears	F	to	A,	then	X	is	F	for	A.	On	this	view,	for	instance,	if	the	measure	doctrine	appears	false	to	Socrates,	then	the	measure	doctrine	is	false	for	Socrates.	Socrates	sometimes	worries	about	a	narrow	Protagoreanism	that	applies	not	to	all	appearances	but	only	to	sense-perceptions.	This	would	exclude	the	measure	doctrine's	appearing	false,	but	include	the	wind's	appearing	chilly.	Last,	Socrates	acknowledges	still	other	ways	of	restricting	Protagoreanism,	such	as	applying	it	only	to	certain	evaluative	appearances.	This	suggests	how	someone	might	understand	well-being	in	a	pure	subjectivist	way. 	On	such	a	view,	what	appears	to	me	to	be	well-being	is	well-5being	for	me.			 In	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates	responds	to	Protagoreanism	with	a	barrage	of	objections,	some	of	which	(such	as	the	claim	that	it	refutes	itself	[170a-171d])	target	the	perfectly	general	version	and	some	of	which	(such	as	the	distinction	between	sense-perception	and	knowledge	[183b-186e])	target	the	narrow	version	that	concerns	sense-perceptions	only. 	6But	at	least	two	of	his	objections	would	tell	against	Protagoreanism	about	well-being	(cf.	Crat.	385e-386e).			 First,	what	we	take	to	be	good	for	us	belongs	to	the	class	of	our	concerns	about	the	future.	Even	if	everyone	is	the	measure	of	what	is	for	him	or	her,	we	can	ask	whether	every	person	is	also	the	measure	of	what	will	be	for	him	or	her	(178a-179b).	If	a	layman	thinks	that	drinking	this	particular	concoction	will	make	his	bodily	condition	appear	good	to	him	and	thus	be	good	for	him,	his	future	experience	might	convict	his	thought	of	error.	Moreover,	a	doctor	might	be	the	better	measure	of	how	the	man's	body	would	appear	to	
	For	such	views,	see	XXX	(this	volume).5	For	the	Nirst	of	these,	see	especially	Burnyeat	(1976).	For	the	second,	see	Cooper	(1970).6
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him	after	he	drank	the	concoction.	In	response,	it	will	not	do	for	the	Protagorean	to	raise	doubts	about	personal	identity	through	time	(cf.	166b).	When	I	predict	that	X	will	appear	F	to	A	tomorrow,	it	does	not	matter	whether	I	am	identical	with	A.	If	X	does	not	appear	F	to	A	tomorrow,	my	prediction	has	been	shown	false.	The	Protagorean	would	do	better	to	characterize	my	prediction	more	carefully.	She	should	say	that	it	appears	to	me	now	that	X	will	appear	F	to	A	tomorrow,	for	X's	not	appearing	F	to	A	tomorrow	does	not	contradict	how	things	appear	to	me	now.	But	if	I	am	the	measure	only	of	how	tomorrow	seems	to	me	here	and	now,	I	am	not	the	measure	of	how	things	will	be	tomorrow.	I	cannot	make	a	genuine	prediction,	and	this	is	a	serious	cost	to	the	theory,	given	the	practical	importance	of	predictions,	which	Socrates'	discussion	makes	plain.	A	person	could,	conceivably,	muddle	through	life	with	nothing	more	than	appearances	of	what	will	appear	to	be	the	case	tomorrow.	But	if	he	or	she	never	thinks	that	later	appearances	make	a	difference	to	the	value	of	earlier	predictions	and	if	his	or	her	judgments	of	what	will	appear	to	be	the	case	in	the	future	never	change	accordingly,	then	he	or	she	will	be	incapable	of	learning	by	trial	and	error,	which	requires	recognizing	error.	Such	a	creature's	life	will	be	very	short	or	very	lucky.	Others	could	perhaps	help	him	or	her	by	making	apparent	to	him	or	her	things	that	will	keep	him	or	her	safe.	But	the	creature	could	not	say	that	these	helpers	are	wise,	for	the	creature	could	not	say	that	the	helpers	make	the	appearances	better	than	they	were	before. 		7	 This	argument	from	predictions	grounds	a	general	concern	that	Socrates	repeatedly	raises,	that	Protagoreanism	undermines	the	distinction	between	the	wise	and	unwise.	The	measure	doctrine	takes	everyone	to	be	equally	good	at	determining	how	things	are,	but	
	Chappell	(2004:	132).7
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Socrates	thinks	that	this	is	a	special	achievement.	Of	course,	the	measure	doctrine	does	this	by	collapsing	the	distinction	between	how	things	appear	to	be	and	how	they	are,	and	Socrates	rejects	this	conNlation.	This	would	be	Socrates'	second	response	to	Protagoreanism	about	well-being:	it	gets	the	ontology	wrong,	construing	well-being	as	a	relation	between	the	world	and	the	passive	receptions	of	a	human	being	when	it	is	a	matter	of	stance-independent	fact	for	a	human	being	to	discover	by	active	effort.	Socrates	maintains	that	we	cannot	even	coherently	represent	things	as	being	the	way	Protagoreans	have	to	take	them	to	be,	because	our	language	attributes	more	independence	and	stability	to	features	of	the	world	than	the	collapse	of	appearance	and	reality	can	allow	(cf.	179c-183b).			 Socrates	encounters	Protagoreanism	in	the	Protagoras,	too,	though	readers	usually	miss	it. 	Here	Protagoras	initially	fails	to	identify	courage	and	wisdom	because	he	assumes	8that	something	beyond	knowledge,	some	natural	spiritedness,	is	required	to	motivate	right	action	in	the	face	of	fear	(351a-b).	But	Socrates	gets	Protagoras	to	identify	courage	and	wisdom	(360d-e).	He	argues	that	any	motivation	represents	a	course	of	action	under	the	guise	of	some	apparent	value.	To	be	moved	by	pleasure	is	to	pursue	something	pleasant	that	one	takes	to	be	good	for	one.	To	be	moved	by	fear	is	to	avoid	something	fearsome	that	one	takes	to	be	bad	for	one	(358d).	So	one	cannot	act	without	representing	one's	action	as	good	for	one,	without	believing	that	it	is	the	thing	to	do.	Socrates	also	argues	that	one	cannot	act	against	one's	knowledge	of	what	to	do.	Most	people	deny	this,	because	they	construe	knowledge	as	just	another	mental	state,	just	like	pleasure	or	pain,	fear	or	love.	But	Socrates	argues	that	knowledge	is	a	special	achievement	that	contrasts	with	these	other	motivations.	They	represent	what	appears	to	be	good	or	bad	for	one	whereas	knowledge	
	Vlastos	(1956)	is	an	exception.8
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depends	upon	taking	the	measure	of	appearances	and	determining	what	is	good	or	bad	for	one.	Knowledge	exists	where	how	things	appear	to	one	have	been	fully	settled	in	favor	of	how	things	are,	and	such	a	condition	does	not	admit	of	contrary	appearances	that	could	motivate	action	counter	to	knowledge.		 Much	of	Socrates'	argument	in	these	pages	is	pitched	explicitly	against	the	many,	and	not	Protagoras,	and	much	of	it	invokes	a	narrow	hedonism	about	value.	But	Socrates'	aim	is	to	convert	Protagoras	from	seeing	knowledge	as	just	one	motivation	like	fear	to	seeing	knowledge	as	something	very	different	from	other	motivating	mental	states.	He	introduces	pleasure	and	pain	as	two	among	many	motivating	passions,	alongside	fear,	love,	and	others	(352b-e).	He	needs	to	establish	that	all	these	motivating	passions	share	a	defect	that	knowledge	lacks,	and	he	does	so	by	contrasting	their	reliance	on	how	things	appear	to	be	good	or	bad	with	the	knower's	art	of	taking	the	measure	of	appearances	and	determining	how	things	are.	Thus,	after	Socrates	has	induced	Protagoras	to	agree	that	courage,	like	the	other	virtues,	is	identical	to	wisdom,	he	summarizes	his	conclusion	that	all	virtues	are	forms	of	knowledge	oddly,	saying	"all	things	are	knowledge	[πάντα	χρήματά	ἐστιν	
ἐπιστήμη]"	(361b1-2,	emphasis	mine).	He	is	pointedly	echoing	Protagoras'	measure	doctrine,	"that	of	all	things	a	human	being	is	the	measure	[πάντων	χρημάτων	μέτρον	
ἀνθρωπον	εἶναι]"	(Tht.	152a2-3).	On	Socrates'	view,	in	the	Protagoras	no	less	than	in	the	
Theaetetus,	Protagoreanism	misconstrues	measure,	conNlating	appearance	with	reality,	when	there	is	a	measuring	art	that	makes	its	possessors	wise	and	virtuous.		
4.	Hedonist	conceptions	
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	 Protagoreanism	about	well-being	Nlatters	the	democratically	inclined,	because	it	makes	every	person	equally	an	authority	over	what	makes	her	own	life	go	well, 	but	it	is	not	9a	thought	that	Plato's	dialogues	attribute	to	most	Athenians.	Yet	Socrates	does	regularly	attribute	to	them	another	sophisticated	development	of	the	naïve	thought	that	well-being	is	constituted	by	possessing	things	that	are	good	for	us.	This	is	the	view	that	well-being	consists	in	pleasure	(or	good	feelings)	and	the	absence	of	pain	(or	bad	feelings),	where	pleasure	either	is	or	strongly	correlates	with	the	satisfaction	of	desire.	One	might	again	think	that	this	is	a	family	of	views,	as	one	might	want	to	distinguish	hedonism	about	well-being	from	a	desire-satisfaction	view	of	it,	and	one	might	want	to	distinguish	both	of	those	from	emotional	well-being.	But	the	dialogues	do	not	sharply	distinguish	here.	The	unifying	thoughts,	which	also	tie	these	views	to	Protagoreanism,	are	these:	people	desire	just	what	they	take	to	be	good	for	them	and	they	take	to	be	good	for	them	just	what	feels	good	to	them.	On	any	view	animated	by	these	thoughts,	possessing	what	is	good	for	us	causes	our	well-being	by	bringing	us	the	pleasure	of	satisNied	desire	that	is	well-being.					 The	Gorgias	dramatizes	how	this	broad	hedonism	about	well-being	can	stand	behind	the	naïve	"objective	list"	approach	to	well-being.	After	Socrates	makes	trouble	for	Polus'	claim	that	a	wealthy	tyrant	enjoys	a	good	life	despite	being	unjust,	Callicles	emerges	to	defend	Polus.	Callicles	rejects	Socrates'	"conventional"	understanding	of	justice,	in	favor	of	a	"natural"	justice	according	to	which	the	stronger	deserve	more	than	the	weaker	(483a-484c).	On	his	view,	life	goes	well	not	when	one	restrains	one's	desires	with	temperance	and	conventional	justice,	but	when	one	allows	one's	appetites	to	grow	as	large	
	Farrar	(1989)	and	Shaw	(2015).9
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as	possible	and	one	has	the	courage	and	shrewd	judgment	to	satisfy	those	appetites	and	continually	Nill	themselvesoneself	with	pleasures	(491e-492c,	494a-b).		 Socrates	puts	pressure	on	Callicles'	conception	of	well-being	in	two	ways.	First,	he	suggests	that	the	pursuit	of	this	well-being	undermines	itself	(492e-494a).	Pleasure	demands	the	satisfaction	of	one's	appetites,	but	their	satisfaction	merely	prompts	the	growth	of	more	appetites.	Second,	he	tries	a	series	of	maneuvers	to	get	Callicles	to	concede	that	there	is	a	difference	between	what	is	good	for	us	and	our	pleasure	(494b-499b).	One	maneuver	is	to	appeal	to	shameful	pleasures,	to	suggest	that	some	pleasures	are	intrinsically	bad	for	us	(494b-495c).	Another	is	to	argue	that	because	a	momentary	pleasure	can	be	felt	at	the	same	time	as	a	momentary	pain,	pleasure	and	pain	are	not	genuine	opposites,	and	that	because	what	is	good	for	us	and	what	is	bad	for	us	are	genuine	opposites,	pleasure	cannot	be	what	is	good	for	us	(494e-497e).	Third,	Socrates	argues	that	the	presence	of	good	things	in	us	should	make	us	better,	but	pleasure	evidently	does	not	make	us	better,	since	pleasure	occurs	in	foolish	people	just	as	readily	as	it	occurs	in	intelligent	people,	though	it	is	better	to	be	intelligent	than	foolish.			 These	maneuvers	are	a	mixed	bag,	but	there	is	something	to	them.	If	well-being	is	identiNied	with	pleasure	and	serves	as	the	ultimate	end	for	the	sake	of	which	a	person	should	do	everything	she	does,	pleasure	needs	to	be	unconditionally	good.	It	needs	to	fulNill	what	goodness	fulNills	without	any	deNicit.	But	pleasure	does	not	seem	able	to	do	that.	Some	pleasures,	in	some	circumstances,	are	not	good.	At	least,	our	shame	prevents	us	from	taking	them	to	be	good,	and	our	thoughts	about	what	something	good	for	us	does	for	us	prevents	us	from	taking	them	to	be	good.		
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	 Socrates	assumes	throughout	his	response	to	Callicles	that	the	best	account	of	well-being	will	have	to	be	coherent	(cf.	481c-482c).	He	takes	pride	in	the	consistency	of	philosophy,	and	derides	Callicles	for	his	inconsistencies.	So	it	matters	that	Callicles'	sense	of	shame	does	not	cohere	with	his	explicit	theory	of	well-being,	and	it	matters	that	Callicles'	understanding	of	goodness	and	badness	does	not	match	his	understanding	of	how	pleasure	and	pain	work	in	us.	Socrates	does	not	think	that	the	evaluation	of	a	theory	of	well-being	can	be	assessed	by	a	few	isolated	commitments.			 Nor,	it	seems,	does	Callicles.	At	least,	after	Socrates'	maneuvers,	Callicles	says	that	he	never	meant	to	deny	that	some	pleasures	are	better	than	others	(499b).	But	if	one	pleasure	is	better	than	another,	not	because	it	is	more	of	a	pleasure	and	not	because	it	gives	rise	to	more	pleasure,	then	there	must	be	something	good	for	us	that	is	intelligible	apart	from	pleasure,	some	non-hedonic	standard	of	goodness	by	which	to	adjudicate	pleasures	as	better	and	worse.	Socrates	runs	with	this,	and	argues	that	the	wise	pursuit	of	the	best	pleasures	will	require	a	craft	to	pick	out	the	better	and	the	worse	(499c-505b).		 Despite	Socrates'	forthright	rejection	of	Callicles'	hedonism,	many	readers	think	that	Plato's	dialogues	endorse	a	hedonic	conception	of	well-being.	There	are	three	principal	grounds	for	such	suspicion.			 First,	Socrates	seems	to	endorse	hedonism	toward	the	end	of	the	Protagoras. 	10Readers	are	struck	by	the	way	Socrates	introduces	hedonism,	abruptly	and	without	any	hint	of	dissent	(351b-e).	They	are	struck,	too,	by	the	way	Socrates	presents	himself	and	Protagoras	together	as	teachers	of	the	many,	drawing	out	of	them	a	commitment	to	hedonism	(353c-354e).	But	Socrates	must	shift	abruptly	after	his	Nirst	attempt	to	show	that	
	Taylor	(1991)	and	Irwin	(1995).10
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courage	is	identical	to	wisdom	has	failed	(349e-351b).	Protagoras	has	insisted	that	courage	requires	spiritedness	in	addition	to	knowledge,	to	overcome	fear.	Socrates	needs	a	fresh	start	to	establish	that	knowledge	is	not	something	that	can	be	overcome	by	fear.	Moreover,	Protagoras	has	already	indicated	some	afNinity	for	hedonism	(317c,	320c),	and	as	I	have	explained,	Socrates	associates	Protagoreanism	with	hedonism.	When	Protagoras	balks	at	endorsing	hedonism	(351b-e),	Socrates	offers	him	the	chance	to	consider	what	the	many	would	say	instead	of	answering	for	himself,	just	as	he	did	earlier	when	Protagoras	balked	at	admitting	that	unjust	action	can	be	temperate	(333c).	This	gives	Socrates	the	chance	to	continue	to	examine	Protagoras'	own	views,	without	Protagoras	having	to	admit	openly	to	holding	those	views.	The	delicacy	of	his	situation	is	enough	to	explain	the	elaborate	pretense	that	Socrates	and	Protagoras	would	together	elicit	hedonism	from	the	many.	The	articulation	of	hedonism	and	the	assignment	of	this	view	to	the	many	merely	enable	Socrates	to	show	what	is	wrong	with	the	assumption	that	knowledge	can	be	overcome	by	a	passion.	This	larger	purpose	does	not,	as	we	have	seen,	require	hedonism.	We	need	not	suppose	that	Socrates	endorses	hedonism	in	the	Protagoras;	he	can	use	it	dialectically,	in	an	ad	hominem	argument. 		11	 Second,	in	the	Republic,	Socrates	offers	three	"proofs"	that	it	is	always	better	to	be	just	than	unjust,	and	each	of	these	proofs	seems	to	appeal	to	a	broadly	hedonic	conception	of	well-being.	According	to	the	Nirst	(culminating	at	577c-580c),	the	tyrannically	constituted	soul,	ruled	by	lawless	appetitive	desires,	is	least	able	to	do	what	it	wants,	and	suffers	regret	about	past	failures	to	satisfy	desire,	neediness	about	present	failures,	and	fear	about	future	ones,	whereas	the	justly	ordered,	aristocratically	constituted	soul,	ruled	by	rational	desire,	
	Zeyl	(1980)	and	Shaw	(2015).11
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is	most	able	to	do	what	it	wants,	and	suffers	least	from	regret,	neediness,	and	fear.	As	a	result,	Socrates	and	Glaucon	agree,	the	tyrannical	soul	enjoys	the	least	well-being	(eudaimonia)	and	the	aristocratic	soul	the	most.	This	inference	seems	to	identify	well-being	with	good	feelings	and	the	absence	of	bad	feelings.	The	second	and	third	proofs	are	even	clearer.	Though	they	are	supposed	to	establish	the	same	conclusion	as	the	Nirst,	concerning	well-being	(eudaimonia)	(583b),	they	explicitly	show	that	the	just	person's	aristocratically	constituted	soul	enjoys	the	most	pleasure,	more	than	any	unjust	person's	soul	(580c-588a).	Because	Socrates	advances	these	as	proofs	of	the	thesis	he	plainly	endorses,	it	is	natural	to	suppose	that	he	endorses	the	broadly	hedonist	conception	of	well-being	they	invoke. 	12	 But	this	cannot	be	right.	Socrates	and	his	interlocutors	in	the	Republic	agree	that	well-being	(eudaimonia)	is	the	ultimate	end	"which	every	soul	pursues	and	for	the	sake	of	which	every	soul	does	everything	it	does"	(505e1-2). 	But	in	the	Republic	Socrates	13explicitly	rejects	pleasure	and	good	feelings	as	this	end.	In	fact,	he	appeals	to	both	considerations	that	he	offers	against	Calliclean	hedonism	in	the	Gorgias.	First,	he	insists	that	pleasure	is	not	unconditionally	good,	because	there	are	intrinsically	bad	pleasures	(505c;	cf.	509a).	This	makes	pleasure	a	bad	Nit	to	be	what	fully	justiNies	action.	Socrates	underscores	this	point	with	reNlection	on	the	Protagorean	side	of	the	broadly	hedonist	approach	to	well-being.	What	feels	or	appears	good	to	one	is	not	the	same	as	what	is	good	for	one,	and	the	ultimate	end	is	what	is	good	for	one	(505d). 		 	14	 	
	Butler	(2003).12	Notice	the	terms	of	the	challenge	put	to	Socrates	and	of	his	answer:	347e	with	352d,	358a,	361c-d,	365c-d,	13545a-b,	580b-c.	See	Kamtekar	(2006).14
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Second,	Socrates	argues	that	the	pursuit	of	pleasure	and	good	feelings	undermines	itself.	This	emerges	as	a	corollary	to	his	critique	of	spirited	and	especially	appetitive	desire.	The	critique	rests	on	three	observations.	First,	because	good	feelings	arrive	with	the	satisfaction	of	desire,	they	can	come	cheaply.	All	three	parts	of	the	human	soul	have	their	own	pleasures	(581c),	and	agents	of	many	different	kinds	achieve	good	feelings.	Next,	if	spirited	and	appetitive	desires	are	indulged	and	are	not	held	in	check	by	countervailing	commitments	to	what	is	genuinely	good	for	one,	they	will	grow	stronger	and	more	numerous	(589a-b	with	571b-572b,	416e-417a,	549a-b;	cf.	602c-606d).	Third,	as	spirited	and	appetitive	desires	grow,	they	increasingly	conNlict	with	each	other	and	in	other	ways	increasingly	outstrip	our	ability	to	satisfy	them,	leading	to	the	regret,	neediness,	and	fear	that	characterize	the	tyrannical	soul.	This	empirical	critique,	like	the	"paradox	of	hedonism," 	suggests	that	there	is	something	self-defeating	about	pursuing	pleasure	15directly.	But	because	well-being,	as	the	ultimate	end,	is	supposed	to	explain	as	well	as	justify	action,	one	must	be	able	to	successfully	pursue	it	directly.	So	the	empirical	critique	impugns	hedonist	conceptions	of	well-being.			Socrates'	rejection	of	hedonist	theories	of	well-being	in	the	Republic	further	explains	why	he	rejects	Adeimantus'	appeal	to	a	naïve	"objective	list"	approach,	too	(466b,	with	419a-420a).	Many	of	the	goods	on	the	"objective	list"	are	only	conditionally	valuable,	and	are	the	objects	of	spirited	and	appetitive	desire.	So	they	are	problematic	as	ultimate	ends,	and,	as	we	will	see	below,	as	constituents	of	the	ultimate	end.		 		 We	might	still	wonder	about	Republic's	stance	on	well-being.	Why	would	Socrates	invoke	broadly	hedonist	conceptions	of	well-being	that	he	rejects	in	order	to	argue	for	his	
	See	XXX	(this	volume:	XXX).15
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thesis	that	it	is	always	better	to	be	just	than	unjust?	Because	he	needs	to.	He	cannot	show	that	it	is	better	to	be	just	than	unjust	on	the	"objective	list"	conception	of	well-being	that	Thrasymachus,	Glaucon,	and	Adeimantus	have	assumed.	Nor	can	he	simply	invoke	his	own	conception	of	well-being	if,	as	I	will	suggest	below,	his	opponents	are	apt	to	see	it	as	question-begging.	The	broadly	hedonist	conception	of	well-being	comports	with	his	interlocutors'	views	nearly	enough,	and	it	gives	Socrates	just	enough	room	to	argue	for	his	conclusion.	So	it	serves	his	dialectical	purposes.	He	might	even	think	that	the	hedonist	conceptions	are	extensionally	adequate	representations	of	well-being—that	well-being	does	in	fact	correlate	perfectly	with	the	presence	of	good	feelings	and	the	absence	of	bad	feelings.	What	is	clear	is	that	he	rejects	these	conceptions	as	intensionally	inadequate:	they	do	not	capture	the	ultimate	end	of	our	rational	pursuits. 	16	 The	third	principal	source	for	those	who	would	attribute	a	hedonist	conception	of	well-being	to	Plato	is	the	Laws.	When	the	Athenian	argues	that	someone	who	suffers	no	conventional	evil	but	is	unjust	does	not	enjoy	well-being,	he	faces	special	resistance	from	the	fact	that	such	a	person	seems	to	live	pleasantly	(661d-662a).	The	Athenian	concedes	that	the	best	life	is	most	pleasant	(662a-664c;	cf.	732e-734d),	and	he	concedes	that	people	are	motivated	by	pleasure	to	the	extent	that	they	will	not	be	motivated	to	do	anything	that	does	not	bring	more	pleasure	than	pain	(663b).	These	concessions	might	suggest	hedonism	about	well-being,	but	they	should	not.	The	Athenian	says	that	what	is	good	for	a	person	and	what	is	pleasant	for	her	are	inseparable,	but	not	identical	(663a-b;	cf.	662a	and	734d-e).	This	comports	with	Socrates'	arguments	in	the	Republic:	the	most	just	life	is	best	and	most	pleasant,	but	well-being	is	not	identical	with	pleasure.			 	
	Cf.	Eu.	11a-b	with	Evans	(2012).16
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5.	The	Socratic	conception	
	 Against	Protagoras,	Socrates	maintains	that	well-being	is	a	matter	of	objective	fact,	discoverable	by	the	wise.	Against	hedonists,	he	maintains	that	well-being	must	be	an	unconditional	good	that	one	can	successfully	pursue	directly.	These	arguments	make	trouble	for	many	of	the	goods	on	the	naïve	list	of	what	causes	our	lives	to	go	well.	But	they	make	no	trouble	for	wisdom	and	especially,	if	we	recall	the	Euthydemus'	insistence	on	use	or	activity,	wise	activity.	And	in	fact	Socrates	frequently	insists	that	well-being—doing	well,	being	successful—is	identical	to	virtuous	activity	(Charm.	171e-172a,	Cr.	48b,	Euthd.	278e-282d,	Gorg.	507c,	Rep.	353e-354a),	and	since	he	also	frequently	insists	that	virtue	is	or	at	least	requires	wisdom, 	he	can	also	be	taken	to	say	that	well-being	is	wisevirtuous	17activity.		 Although	Socrates	suggests	this	view	in	Book	One	of	the	Republic	(353e-354a),	he	cannot	assume	it	in	the	rest	of	the	dialogue,	since	Glaucon	and	Adeimantus	issue	a	challenge	that	rests	on	a	competing	conception	of	well-being.	This	helps	to	explain	why	Socrates'	arguments	in	the	Republic	appeal,	as	we	have	seen,	to	a	conception	of	well-being	that	he	rejects	and	why	so	few	readers	of	Plato	attribute	to	him	this	clear,	Socratic	conception	of	well-being	as	virtuous	activity. 	18	 But	there	are	also	other	reasons	why	readers	miss	this.	First,	the	Socratic	view	seems	to	Nit	poorly	with	Socrates'	broader	understanding	of	value.	At	least	apart	from	the	
	For	the	identity	claim,	the	"unity	of	virtues"	thesis,	see	Penner	(1973).	17	Compare,	for	instance,	the	characterizations	of	Socrates'	conception(s)	of	well-being	in	the	Republic	by	18Annas	(1981:	314-334)	and	Reeve	(1988:	153-159).	
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Euthydemus,	he	identiNies	things	other	than	wisdom	as	good	for	us,	and	he	even	insists	that	some	such	things	are	non-instrumentally	good	for	us	(e.g.,	Rep.	357b-358a).	But	Socrates	can	consider	something	to	be	non-instrumentally	good—good	regardless	of	what	follows	from	it—without	thinking	that	it	is	unconditionally	good—good	in	all	circumstances.	A	pleasantly	amusing	activity	might	be	Ninally	valuable,	but	not	unconditionally	so,	because	it	would	not	be	good	when,	say,	virtue	required	helping	someone. 	The	recognition	of	Ninal	19goods	other	than	virtuous	activity	does	not	entail	the	recognition	of	unconditional	goods	other	than	wise	virtuous	activity,	and	as	the	ultimate	goal	to	explain	and	justify	action,	well-being	must	be	an	unconditional	good.				 Nevertheless,	even	if	Socrates	does	not	have	to	identify	Ninal	goods	as	constituents	of	well-being	and	parts	of	the	ultimate	end,	he	still	might	do	so.	Even	if	goods	other	than	virtue	and	virtuous	activity	are	only	conditionally	valuable,	still	they	might	be	conditionally	valuable	parts	of	an	unconditionally	valuable	whole,	and	Socrates	might	be	thought	to	develop	this	possibility	in	the	Philebus. 	But	the	Philebus	addresses	three	questions	that	20are	not	easily	kept	distinct:	(1)	What	is	the	successful	life	like?	(2)	What	things	are	good	for	a	human	being,	by	causally	promoting	a	successful	life?	and	(3)	What	is	the	good	for	a	human	being,	the	ultimate	goal	of	action,	which	is	the	success	of	a	successful	life?	Socrates	plainly	suggests	that	a	successful	life	is	a	mixed	life,	including	various	pleasures	and	knowledge	(60c-61a,	cf.	22a-23a),	and	he	plainly	thinks	that	some	pleasures	and	knowledge	are	good	for	a	human	being.	But	does	he	conclude	that	these	various	goods	constitute	a	single	unconditional	good	that	is	the	success	of	a	successful	life?	It	seems,	
	Cf.	Korsgaard	(1983).	19	Cooper	(1977).20
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rather,	that	he	means	to	isolate	the	best	part	of	a	mixed	life,	and	to	assign	a	special	role	to	it	(64c-d).	He	says	that	what	makes	a	mixture	of	goods	a	successful	life	is	what	puts	this	mixture	into	a	kind	of	unity,	manifesting	beauty,	measure,	and	truth	(64d-65a).	This	seems	to	locate	the	success	of	a	successful	life	not	in	the	various	goods	mixed	into	it,	but	in	the	wise	way	in	which	they	are	mixed.	If	this	is	what	Socrates	means,	then	he	is	not	taking	back	his	thought	that	the	unconditional	good,	the	ultimate	goal	of	action,	is	virtuous	or	wise	activity.					 Charity	might	generate	a	third	reason	to	doubt	that	Plato	fully	endorses	a	Socratic	conception	of	well-being	as	virtuous	activity.	After	all,	this	conception	is	indeterminate	to	the	point	of	being	uninformative.	For	what	is	virtuous	activity?	It	certainly	will	not	do	to	say	that	it	is	the	sort	of	activity	that	is	done	for	the	sake	of	being	virtuous	activity.	But	Plato's	dialogues	offer	two	ways	of	identifying	virtuous	activity.	The	Nirst	is	psychology.	Virtue	is	the	disposition	that	makes	its	possessor	do	what	it	essentially	does	well	(Rep.	352d-354d).	To	give	an	account	of	the	virtues	of	the	soul,	then,	one	must	Nirst	give	an	account	of	how	the	soul	works.	An	account	of	healthy	and	unhealthy	psychological	functioning	will	identify	the	virtues	as	the	dispositions	of	healthy	functioning. 	21	 The	second	way	of	identifying	virtue	is	wisdom.	For	Plato,	virtue	is	or	requires	wisdom,	and	wisdom	is	or	requires	a	coherent	grasp	of	how	things	are.	So	virtue	is	determined	not	merely	from	the	"scientiNic"	point	of	view,	working	out	an	explanatory	account	of	how,	say,	anger	works,	or	love,	or	lust,	but	also	from	the	agent's	point	of	view,	working	out	how	these	feelings,	and	the	values	they	implicate,	do	and	do	not	hang	together	with	each	other	and	with	all	our	other	attitudes.	Only	if	we	can	survive	Socratic	
	Cf.	XXX		on	perfectionism	(this	volume).21
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examination	can	we	begin	to	think	that	we	might	be	wise	and	virtuous,	and	this	constrains	what	wise	and	virtuous	activity	could	be. 		22	 Of	course,	these	methods	are	hard,	and	reasonable	people	can	disagree	about	where	they	lead.	The	many	followers	of	Socrates	and	Plato	who	embraced	the	Socratic	conception	of	well-being	as	virtuous	activity	disagreed	sharply	about	what	virtuous	activity	is.	Some,	including	Cynics	and	Stoics,	took	a	more	ascetic,	but	also	more	democratic	and	psychologized,	view:	they	think	that	virtuous	activity	is	available	to	anyone,	just	by	the	achievement	of	psychological	coherence,	and	not	requiring	good	fortune	in	one's	external	circumstances.	Others,	such	as	Aristotle,	believe	that	virtuous	activity,	as	the	best	realization	of	the	best	condition	a	human	being	can	be	in,	is	what	a	powerful,	beautiful,	wealthy,	and	in	other	ways	fortunate	member	of	a	ruling	élite	does.	On	this	view,	humans	naturally	desire	certain	aristocratic	ends,	and	virtuous	activity	is	hampered,	even	if	only	slightly,	by	the	frustration	of	these	desires.	So,	on	this	view,	pPsychological	coherence	itself	requires	some	good	fortune.	These	debates	between	Peripatetics	and	Stoics	play	out	possibilities	left	open	by	Plato's	dialogues,	as	Greek	philosophers	tried	to	determine	what	well-being	is	by	determining	what	virtuous	activity	is. 	23
Related	topics	
Aristotle,	Objective	List	Theories,	Perfectionism,	Subjectivism,	Hedonism.		
	On	coherence	as	a	constraint,	cf.	XXX	(this	volume).22	This	chapter	condenses	interpretations	I	develop	at	greater	length	elsewhere,	and	I	thank	those	who	have	23helped	with	those	forthcoming	essays,	including	especially	Emily	Austin,	Scott	Berman,	Erik	Curiel,	Matt	Evans,	Verity	Harte,	Rusty	Jones,	Rachana	Kamtekar,	Richard	Kraut,	Casey	Perin,	David	Reeve,	Clerk	Shaw,	Rachel	Singpurwalla,	Iakovos	Vasiliou,	Matt	Walker,	and	Eric	Wiland.
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Suggestions	for	Further	Reading	
Plato,	especially	the	Euthydemus,	Protagoras,	Gorgias,	Republic,	and	Philebus.	For	alternatives	to	the	interpretations	mooted	here,	start	with	Irwin	(1995)	and	Annas	(1999).	
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